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Abstract: Military coups have posed a persistent threat to political stability in Africa, un-
dermining democratization efforts, igniting insurgencies, and leading to years of devastating
military governance. Initial cross-national studies found little consistent evidence linking eth-
nicity to coups, leading recent formal and statistical work on coup risk and coup-proofing to
largely ignore ethnic politics. This article, however, argues that in two important contexts
of African political development—decolonization and democratization—ethnic politics are
critical to understanding the occurrence of coups. Both case study evidence and statistical
analysis of original data on African military history and ethnic politics reveals that practices
of ethnic manipulation within security institutions have driven coup attempts. When lead-
ers attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created by their predecessors, they
provoke violent resistance from military officers.
On April 12th, 2012, rebellious soldiers seized power in Guinea-Bissau. They quickly
established control over the small capital city, captured the TV and radio stations, and
detained both the interim President and the front-runner in the upcoming presidential elec-
tions. A week later, gun and mortar fire could still be heard in Bissau although power rested
firmly in the hands of the new military junta. Promises were made of new elections and a
return to constitutional rule. This is a familiar story for the citizens of Guinea-Bissau, whose
military has time and again overthrown the government and then retreated to the barracks
by holding elections—only to repeat the cycle. Since independence, no elected president has
managed to serve out his full term.
Guinea-Bissau is not alone in its struggle to escape a pernicious cycle of military inter-
ventionism and build democratic institutions. Military coups pose a profound and persistent
threat to political stability in Africa. While the last decade has witnessed an overall decline
in coup incidences (Powell and Thyne 2011), they are still a far too common event in Africa.
In the last five years alone, coups have been staged against the governments of Egypt, Eritrea,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Since independence, over
215 coup attempts have been made across the continent, affecting 43 countries. Nearly half
of these have been successful, displacing civilian governments, undermining democratization
efforts, and leading to years of devastating military governance. Compelling evidence exists
that coups also ignite insurgencies by weakening the central government and thereby open-
ing up opportunities for rebellion (Fearon 2003(b), 280). In the midst of Mali’s March 2012
coup, for example, Tuareg rebels launched a powerful military offensive. They and Islamic
rebel groups proceeded to capture much of the country before French intervention forces
drove them back.
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Given the impact that military coups have on political stability, civil war onset, and
democratization, it is important to ask: what causes African militaries to intervene so fre-
quently in the domestic politics of their societies?
To answer this question, I depart from recent statistical and formal modeling works that
have come to ignore ethnic politics as an important driver of military coups. Rather, I
ground my theoretical claims in both the ethnic politics literature and the extensive case
study literature on African coups that has long suggested the centrality of ethnic dynamics
to this form of political violence. These theoretical claims are then evaluated using original
data on African military history and original measurements of ethnic manipulation within
security institutions.
I argue that when leaders attempt to build ethnic armies, or dismantle those created
by their predecessors, they provoke violent resistance from military officers. At the critical
juncture of independence, African leaders made important decisions over how they would en-
sure military loyalty. Where leaders conditioned military recruitment, promotion, and access
to patronage on shared identity—despite existing diversity in the colonial officer corps—I
argue that they tended to initiate violent cycles of ethnic coups and counter-coups as officers
resisted discrimination. I find that such countries experienced coups roughly four times as
often as their counterparts in the post-independence period.
I then examine how these historical legacies have impacted democratization efforts in
contemporary Africa. Many leaders did successfully build coethnic armies, either with the
assistance of departing colonial powers or through a violent process of purges. Democratic
elections in a multiethnic society threaten to empower new leaders who no longer ethnically
match these existing armies and have strong incentives to dismantle them. When this occurs,
the ethnically stacked officer corps fears the loss of their power, privilege, and patronage—
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and may react by seizing power. I find that when elections empower a new leader ethnically
distinct from a previously constructed ethnic army, coup risk increases dramatically: from
under 20% to roughly 89%.
This article underscores the necessity of military reform in contemporary Africa. If
democracy is to thrive in multiethnic societies, existing ethnic armies must be dismantled
and national military institutions diversified. Yet, my work should also emphasize how
difficult and dangerous this task will be. Ethnic armies do not stand idly by and allow for
their own demise. Reformers should thus anticipate a struggle.
1 Previous Approaches
In the 1960-70s, the spate of military coups across recently decolonized countries
elicited the development of a statistical literature concerned with the structural risk factors
underlying coup propensity. Such studies analyzed a wide range of potentially important
variables, including the underdevelopment of political institutions, strength of civil society,
degree of military professionalization, number of soldiers and their relative pay, economic
development and growth rates, commodity dependency, past coup history, and ethnic diver-
sity, among others. Yet, these works generated only two consistently statistically significant
findings: that coups tend to occur more frequently in poor countries and where there is a
pattern of past military coups (Jackman 1978; Jackman et al. 1986; Jenkins and Kposowa
1992; Johnson et al. 1984; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Londregan and Poole 1990; Lunde
1991; McGowan and Johnson 1984; O’Kane 1981; Przeworski et al. 1996; more recently see
Bazzi and Blattman 2011; Belkin and Shofer 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2005; Galetovic and
Sanhueza 2000).
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These studies produced no systematic evidence, however, that ethnic politics matters to
the production of military coups, even though many of them were deeply concerned with
ethnic dynamics and included ethnic diversity and dominance measures in their regressions.
Rather, they arrived at contradictory results with some finding significant correlations (Jenk-
ins and Kposowa 1992; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Lunde 1991) and others no relationship
(Collier and Hoeﬄer 2005; Jackman 1978; Jackman et al. 1986). This absence of systematic
evidence linking ethnic politics to military behavior has led recent statistical and formal
work on coups and coup-proofing to neglect ethnicity altogether, even as a control variable
(see Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Galtovic and Sanhueza 2012; Lindberg and Clark 2008; Pilster
and Bo¨hmelt 2011; Powell 2012; Powell and Lasley 2012).
Yet, the case study literature has long suggested that ethnic dynamics are critical to
understanding evolving military dynamics in many African states. For example, thick de-
scriptions of the Ghanaian, Nigerian, and Sierra Leonean armies suggest that ethnic hostil-
ities within these military institutions played an important role in inciting particular coup
attempts (see, respectively, Hutchful 1985; Luckham 1971; Cox 1976). Based on accounts
such as these, medium-N comparative scholars of African politics and ethnicity, such as
Samuel Decalo and Donald Horowitz, have claimed that “ethnic coups” are an important
and distinct phenomenon worthy of theoretical articulation (Decalo 1990 & 1998; Horowitz
1985, 480-492).
If ethnic dynamics are as integral to African military coups as contextually rich case
studies suggest, why then has ethnicity failed to consistently attain significance in cross-
national work that stresses generalizability? The answer, I contend, lies in two limitations
of the existing statistical literature. First, typical studies of coup risk assume arguably
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non-homogeneous units of observation (all country-years). In the weakest version of this
assumption, the same change in an independent variable generates a constant expected effect
across all units. Coups, however, are tactics. Military officers may seize power to achieve
diverse political ends, from capturing the reigns of government to protesting a devastating
war. Coups as tactics may thus be deployed for systematically different reasons dependent
on the larger political context.
For example, civil wars can place extreme pressures on civil-military relations. Battlefield
losses, lack of supplies, and war fatigue have all contributed to military uprisings—including
against France and Portugal’s colonial counterinsurgencies in Africa and Mali’s underfunded
war in the Sahel. When a country is fighting a war, we might therefore expect the adequacy
of arms supply to significantly effect coup propensity. This same variable is unlikely, however,
to exert an identical effect in the absence of war.
Modeling techniques such as interaction effects can account for this type of unit variation
by integrating the observed heterogeneity into the model. This requires, however, that each
context first be properly theorized in its own right, revealing how independent variables are
likely to behave across contexts. Some recent work has moved in this direction: toward the-
orizing and testing hypotheses within a particular political context, rather than developing
universal models that explain coups across all conceivable contexts (an ambitious task for
any tactic). For example, Galetovic and Sanhueza (2012) develop a formal model to explain
coups against autocratic regimes while Clark (2007) and Lindberg and Clark (2008) analyze
coups against liberal democratic African regimes. These context-specific works, however,
have yet to integrate ethnic politics into their models.
A further problem lies in the measurements of ethnicity employed in existing cross-
national studies. Broad social measures of ethnic diversity and dominance have increasingly
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been criticized by the ethnic politics and conflict literatures as “meaningful operational-
ization[s] of ethnic politics” since they cannot capture the often complex causal pathways
between ethnicity and outcomes, including political violence (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008,
527-536; Lieberman and Singh 2012, 1-2). Indeed, there is no compelling theoretical story
linking such measures to the actions of military officers.
This article seeks to overcome these limitations and contribute to our understanding of
how ethnic politics condition military coups and compound the challenges facing liberalizing
African states in three important ways. First, I too take a step back from more univer-
sal statistical approaches and instead build middle-range theory specific to the contexts of
decolonization and, later, democratization. At the same time, I attempt to transcend the
limitations of standard case studies by generating theoretical insights that are testable cross-
nationally, even if constrained by context-specific scope conditions. Through this approach,
I bring back the recently neglected centrality of ethnic politics to African civil-military re-
lations and to our understanding of when African militaries are likely to overthrow elected
leaders. I leave to future research, however, other vital contexts—such as coup dynamics
during civil wars or military responses to social uprisings such as the Arab Spring—as well
as the ultimately desirable theoretical integration of diverse contexts into a more universal
model.
Second, this article also contributes to the commendable effort by scholars of ethnic
politics to better theorize causal mechanisms linking ethnicity to outcomes and to develop
appropriate measures capturing them. For example, the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR)
dataset measures the exclusion of ethnic groups from executive power (Cederman, Wimmer,
and Min 2010; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009); the EVOTE project constructs measures
for the ethnic basis of political parties and how they implicitly and explicitly appeal to
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identity groups (Chandra 2009); and Wilkinson is developing a measure of “ethnic balance”
in postcolonial military institutions (Chandra and Wilkinson 2008, 537-545). In this article,
I similarly develop original measures to capture how ethnic groups were incorporated into
colonial officer corps, whether post-independence leaders recruited officers on an ethnic basis,
whether past leaders had created ethnic armies, and whether a constitutional transfer of
executive power also entailed a change in the ethnic identity of leadership.
Finally, I construct an original dataset on African military history and ethnic manip-
ulations within African security institutions. This data was culled from extensive sources
including archival documents from Africa, Europe, and the United States, historical news-
papers, secondary scholarly accounts, and tertiary reference books and qualitative datasets.
2 A Theory of Ethnic Coups
I make two related arguments, both grounded in an understanding of ethnic politics
and competition, to explain the relative propensity of African militaries to seize state power
in the contexts of decolonization and democratization. The first argument analyzes indepen-
dence as a critical juncture for security institutions and posits the development of coup traps
as a function of how early African leaders chose to build military loyalty. In broad strokes,
I argue that where leaders chose to condition military recruitment and promotion on shared
ethnic ties, despite a diverse colonial officer corps, they tended to set their countries on dan-
gerous paths of violence. The second argument examines the legacies created by this earlier
historical period and their effects on the new critical junctures brought about by the third
wave of democratization. Many African leaders did successfully construct coethnic armies,
either with the help of departing colonial powers or through a violent process of military
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purges. I argue that these ethnic armies view electoral liberalization (in a multiethnic con-
text) as anathema to their corporate interests. Elections open up the possibility that leaders
from new ethnic groups may obtain power and then seek to dismantle the ethnic armies
they inherit. To protect their entrenched position of power and access to patronage, these
armies then undermine processes of democratization by blocking elections or overturning
their results.
2.1 Colonial Military Practices and Decolonization
Military loyalty plays a critical role in regime stability, particularly the loyalty of the
officer corps. Rank-and-file soldiers typically do not command others (excepting NCOs).
Thus, they cannot easily organize large-scale resistance and, when they do revolt, rarely ac-
complish more than a short-term mutiny. On the other hand, officers—including very junior
officers and (rarely) NCOs—can use their position in the command hierarchy and ability to
issue largely uncontestable orders to move troops and engage in combat, without revealing
their anti-government intentions to their subordinates.1 Officers topple governments.2
As African decolonization progressed, troubling events in the region made this general
concern for loyalty acutely urgent. Almost immediately after Sudanese independence in
1956, civil war broke out as black Christian and animist southerners resisted incorporation
into a discriminatory Arab north (who had already disbanded southern army units). Similar
tensions along racial, ethnic, and religious fault lines divided most Sahelian states—divisions
1For example, during the 1971 Moroccan coup, 1400 cadets from the NCO training academy were
mobilized—without being told their mission—to attack the King at his Royal Palace (Keesings 1971).
2Jong-A-Pin and Yu (2010) code the rank of coup leaders for 358 coup attempts drawn from Powell and
Thyne’s (2011) global dataset. They find that 166 such attempts were conducted by senior officers (Flag or
General Officers), 140 by mid-rank or field grade officers (Majors to Colonels), 44 by junior or company grade
officers (2nd Lieutenants to Captains), and 8 by NCOs. None were led by rank-and-file enlisted soldiers.
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created during the 14th century Arab conquest and longstanding trans-Saharan slave trade
and reinforced by colonial policies that granted political autonomy to northern Arab regions
while disproportionately developing infrastructure, education, and economic opportunities
in southern districts. In 1959, with the tacit consent of Belgian officials, the “Rwandan
Revolution” overthrew the Tutsi monarchy. The political upheaval was accompanied by
pogroms in which several thousand Tutsis were massacred, highlighting the vulnerability of
ethnic minorities in new states (Newbury 1998, 13). In August 1960, the Congolese govern-
ment disintegrated after rank-and-file soldiers revolted against continued Belgian officership,
spreading fears of state failure across the continent (Meditz and Merrill 1993). Facing po-
tential ethnic violence, civil war, and state disintegration, African leaders were hard pressed
to find an effective means to tie soldiers to the state.
Colonial military practices provided a ready model of ensuring loyalty through racial and
ethnic manipulations. While native soldiers comprised their rank-and-file, colonial armies
were officered almost exclusively by white Europeans. This remained the case on the eve of
independence and, in many countries, even after the formal transfer of sovereignty. Through-
out colonial Africa, race defined who could be trusted to command.
Conceptions of ethnic loyalty also shaped rank-and-file recruitment practices. British
martial race doctrine, developed first in India, stipulated that some ethnic groups were nat-
urally more politically reliable and suited to combat and military discipline than others.
Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner (1900-1906) and then Governor-General (1912-
1919) of Nigeria, further developed this doctrine in Africa. He proscribed that one ethnic
group should dominate the colonial army, provided that that group was both politically reli-
able and unable to dominate civilian political life (i.e., the local civil service). It was a policy
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of “making the politically strong militarily weak and the politically weak militarily strong
(Ibid, 154).”
Lugard’s model was widely emulated. By such logic, the Kamba and Kalenjiin came to
dominate the Kenyan battalions of the King’s African Rifles, while the Kikuyu were pur-
posely excluded (Parsons 1999, 58). In Uganda, northerners, and especially the northwestern
Acholi and Teso ethnic groups, were targeted for military recruitment (Keegan 1983, 598-
600). Beyond the British, Belgian colonial administrators also established ethnic recruitment
quotas based on racialized perceptions of martial prowess (Adekson 1979, 160-161). Even
the French, who initially avoided deterministic group-based evaluations of military fitness,
were drawn to such practices over time. Tribes from the sparsely populated forest zones
were eventually seen as undesirable soldiers because they lacked a strong martial tradition
(Echenberg 1991, 63).
These colonial practices normalized the idea that race and ethnicity were linked to mil-
itary loyalty. Colonial empires relied on their own ethnic kin to officer far flung armies,
despite the cost and high mortality rates. Lugard’s model of ethnic recruitment further
embraced the notion that state security institutions were best left in the hands of loyal eth-
nic groups. When it came time for independence leaders to Africanize their officer corps’,
many turned to this established model of ethnically-based loyalty. Relying on mechanisms of
ethnic patronage and ethnic affinity to ensure political reliability, they conditioned military
recruitment and promotion on shared ethnicity.
Before delving into how this choice to build stability on ethnic grounds conversely led
to great instability, it is necessary to address an important endogeneity concern. Those
leaders facing divisive ethnic violence may have recruited coethnics into the military to
ensure the loyalty of soldiers in the event of ethnic war. If this were true, then ethnic
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violence would drive both the loyalty choice and subsequent political instability: military
loyalty would be endogenous to existing cycles of ethnic violence. In order to address this
concern, I collected data on two types of ethnic violence between the end of World War
II and the year of independence for each country: ethnic riots and violence conducted by
ethnic political parties against other ethnic groups. Full results are presented in the online
appendix. The correlation between pre-independence acts of ethnic violence and the choice
to build military loyalty on ethnic grounds is -0.14 with a χ2 of 0.2768, which is statistically
insignificant (p > 0.5988).
2.2 The Development of Ethnic Coup Traps
Choosing ethnicity as the foundation for military loyalty was, counterintuitively, dan-
gerous for political stability—despite its very purpose of ensuring such stability. Building
a coethnic army often required not just discriminatory recruitment, but the dismissal or
marginalization of non-coethnic officers. Leaders employed two primary tactics to build
such coethnic security institutions: (1) restructuring the officer corps of the existing army
along coethnic lines, or (2) constructing coethnic parallel military institutions, such as pres-
idential guards and militias, and then disarming the regular army. Both present a similar
threat to existing out-group officers, motivating many initial coup attempts and leading to
cycles of violence wherein ethnic factions within the officer corps attempted to seize power
and purge one another from the ranks.3
Attempting to place a monopoly over the legitimate means of violence in the hands of a
sole identity group inherently threatens excluded groups. They face both discrimination and
3Horowitz theorizes two types of coup traps that exhibit this dynamic of ethnic factionalism, what he
terms the “see-saw” and “attritional” coups (1985, 480-496).
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declining relative power. Recent research in ethnic politics also suggests that conditioning
access to a key state institution on ethnic identity heightens the salience of ethnic divides. By
institutionalizing ethnicity and endowing it with imposed importance, governments prime
individuals to interpret facts and events in terms of ethnicity. Indeed, the more identity
shapes one’s life chances and access to resources, the more useful it becomes as a cognitive
device for reducing uncertainty. Questionable actions and isolated incidents of violence, that
may not be motivated by ethnic differences, are then more likely to be interpreted through
an ethnic lens. This, in turn, escalates communal hostilities (Hale 2008, 33-40; Lieberman
and Singh 2012, 2-6). We thus expect soldiers facing ethnic discrimination to feel threatened,
primed to interpret events in ethnic terms, and faced with a shrinking window of opportunity
in which to reverse their fortunes.
In these circumstances, violent resistance is likely. An initial attempt to restructure the
military along ethnic lines, or perhaps even the anticipation of such restructuring, would
prompt out-groups in the officer corps to protect themselves. Whether they succeed or fail,
an ethnically motivated coup attempt—even if inspired by a defensive logic—aggravates
and threatens officers of other groups, who may then attempt coups of their own. And, as
officers are arrested, purged, and killed in the aftermath of each coup, the dynamics of fear
and mistrust deepen. A cycle of tightly linked reactionary and counter reactionary violence
is thus triggered within the military—an ethnic coup trap.
Initial resistance to the construction of an ethnic army, however, would only take the
form of a military coup where the colonial state had previously built diversity into the
officer corps. Departing colonial powers sometimes colluded with incoming governments to
construct an ethnically homogenous army, matching the ethnicity of the nascent leadership,
prior to decolonization. This was the case, for example, in both Mauritania (Maure) and
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Rwanda (Hutu). Here, the existing officers already benefited from a system of ethnic privilege
within the military and were unlikely to protest its continuation.
Figure 1 summarizes the causal mechanisms that link military loyalty to instability within
the context of African decolonization.
Hypothesis 1: Countries whose independence era leaders chose to build ethnic armies despite
inheriting a diverse (or unmatched) officer corps will develop coup traps.
2.2.1 Sierra Leone and Cameroon
A brief comparison of decolonization processes in Sierra Leone and Cameroon highlights
these dynamics. Early independence leaders in both countries chose to build military loyalty
on ethnic foundations and yet they experienced different coup trajectories: while Sierra Leone
underwent four coup attempts in the decade following independence, Cameroon escaped
from any such military intervention for over 20 years. They key difference was the state
of the officer corps prior to decolonization. In Sierra Leone, the British recruited officers
in a broadly representative fashion across ethnic groups while in Cameroon, French officials
assisted Ahmadou Ahidjo’s government to build a coethnic Fulani/Peuhl military prior to
the formal transfer of sovereignty. Thus, Ahidjo faced no resistance to policies that continued
Fulani/Peuhl dominance of the military while Sir Albert Margai’s attempt to construct a
coethnic Mende army met with stiff resistance from non-Mende officers, resulting in a series
of coups and counter-coups.
Sierra Leone gained formal independence in 1961 under the leadership of Prime Minister
Milton Margai, an ethnic Mende, and the Mende dominated Sierra Leone People’s Party
(SLPP). Milton Margai, however, made no actual choices over military loyalty, leaving Sierra
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Leone’s new national army entirely in the hands of the British, who continued to control
training, recruitment, and promotion (Keegan 1984, 517-18).4 Africanization of the officer
corps proceeded at a slow, but steady pace and the British recruited from across ethnic
groups. In 1964, 26% of officers were Mende, 12% Temne, and 64% were drawn from other,
mostly northern groups (Cox 1976, 54).
Things began to change with the death of Milton Margai in 1964 and the ascension of his
brother Sir Albert to the Prime Ministership. In the face of rising opposition to government
policies at home, and in the aftermath of the 1966 coup in nearby Ghana, around mid-
1966 Sir Albert dismissed the British and assumed control over the military. He quickly
began restructuring the army, principally recruiting his coethnic Mendes (Ibid, 73; Kandeh
1992, 93). Within a year, Mende representation had doubled to 52% of the officer corps
(Cox 1976, 75). This move towards ethnic homogenization provoked immediate discontent
amongst non-Mende officers. In January of 1967, a serious coup plot was foiled only when
the prospect of high level assassinations gave one of the plotters, who was related to the
Minister of Education, cold feet.5 The following month, nine Temne officers were purged
from the military, further increasing Mende domination (Ibid, 100-106).
Scheduled elections in March of 1967, however, gave non-Mende officers hope that demo-
cratic politics could halt this trend towards Mende domination of the security sector. The
opposition party, the All People’s Congress (APC)—who represented northern tribal groups
including the Temne, Susu, Loko, and Mandingo—was popular and nationally competitive.
And although neither side played fair—the incumbent SLPP tampered with ballots and
4Also see Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives (TNA), Colonial Office (CO) 968/681 22A.
5Court records from a later treason trial, related to a different coup attempt, support the real existence
of this plot. At the time of the trial, the northern-based All People’s Congress held power and had little
incentive to invent an earlier coup plot by its own supporters while prosecuting a plot by its detractors (Cox
1976, 100-102).
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engaged in voter intimidation while the opposition’s leader, Siaka Stevens, had trained a
paramilitary force over the border (Allen 1968, 218; Kposowa 2006, 37)—the APC eked out
a win by the narrowest of margins.
Sir Albert, however, backed by Mende soldiers, refused to concede and seized power
back. The following month, Temne and Limba soldiers staged a successful counter-coup and
purged almost all of the existing Mende officers before handing over power to Siaka Stevens
and the APC (Keesings 1968). Stevens then attempted to further narrow the ethnic base
of the military, from a coalition of northern factions that had opposed Mende domination
to his own coethnic Limba. In reaction, Temne officers attempted to seize power in 1971.
They failed and Stevens’ regime was soon able, through additional purges, to achieve Limba
homogeneity of the army and police forces. Stevens also created a paramilitary unit, known
as the Internal Security Unit (ISU)—also predominantly Limba—that was used to inflict
violence on domestic opponents and eventually grew to be more powerful and better equipped
than the regular army (Cox 1976, 106-107; Davies 2000, 352-353; Horowitz 1985, 477-479;
Kandeh 1992, 94).
The choice to ethnically homogenize the army thus provoked a series of coups and coun-
tercoups which only ceased through the eventual creation of coethnic security institutions,
combined with the use of external Guinean troops for added protection. Political stability
was thus achieved under Stevens and the APC regime. The price of this stability, however,
was high: the nearly total ethnicization of the state, reliance on paramilitary units, ram-
pant corruption, erosion of civil liberties, and economic stagnation under Steven’s and then
Momoh’s rule set the stage for later civil war (Kposowa 2006).
In contrast to Sierra Leone, Cameroon experienced great political stability in the immedi-
ate post-colonial period: from independence until his retirement in 1982, Ahmadou Ahidjo’s
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government was never threatened by a coup attempt. And yet Ahidjo made broadly similar
choices to Sir Albert. He too chose to ground military loyalty in shared ethnic identity while
transforming the state into a personal autocracy. The key difference was that in the late
1950s, French colonial authorities helped Ahidjo to build a coethnic officer corps prior to de-
colonization and thus enabled him to continue ethnic recruitment practices without military
protest.
Fears of communism played an important role in conditioning French policies in Cameroon.
A resistance movement against French rule began in 1955, led by the Union des Populations
de Cameroun (UPC), which adopted a broadly socialist ideology. The armed wing of this
movement, the Arme´e de Liberation Nationale Kamerun (ALNK), turned to various com-
munist governments, including both China and the USSR, for military assistance. The esca-
lating Cold War context led both the French and the British—who governed part of colonial
Cameroon—to perceive these ties as evidence of an extreme security threat to the region.6
Rather than compromise with the UPC, French authorities excluded the movement and its
political sympathizers, comprised mainly of southerners and particularly the Bamile´ke´ and
Bassa ethnic groups, from the civilian government that inherited power upon decolonization
(Atangana 2010, 14; Minority Rights Group 2010).
Instead, the French preferred to work with a more “moderate” Cameroonian government
that would shun communism and pledge to maintain strong ties with the French economic
community. In 1958, the French High Commissioner installed Ahmadou Ahidjo and his
northern Fulani/Peuhl-based political party in power (Atangana 2010, 74). In the same year,
France also devolved significant powers to native governments across Africa, including the
construction of national armies. Although Cameroonian troops had previously long served
6TNA, War Office (WO) 208/4385 57A; WO 208/4386 52A & 80A.
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within the regional French Equatorial Africa force, prior to this time no territorial army
had existed. Moreover, the first cohort of native officers did not graduate from the newly
established Yaounde cadet school until 1960-61.7 Ahidjo thus inherited a blank canvas from
which to construct an officer corps while also benefitting from continued French protection.
He chose to recruit these new officers extensively from the north, particularly from his own
ethnic Peuhl group as well as from the allied Fulani (Minorities at Risk 2009; Minority Rights
Group 2010).
Thus decolonization entailed handing over power to a northern-dominated and western-
friendly government, backed by an ethnic army. Ahidjo continued to recruit Fulani and
Peuhls extensively into both the civil service and the security forces until he left office over
20 years later (Minorities at Risk 2009). He never faced a coup attempt.
2.3 Ethnic Armies and Democratization
The ethnic coup traps that developed from decolonization processes could not sustain
themselves indefinitely. Some ended when rebels overthrew a military paralyzed by factional
infighting. Uganda, for example, experienced a remarkable nine coup attempts during the
Idi Amin and second Obote regimes, many of which resisted ethnic manipulations by those
leaders (Horowitz 1985, 486-492). The coups ended when rebel forces under Yoweri Museveni
took over the state. Some rebel groups, such as the Tutsi-based Rwandan Patriotic Front,
were drawn from particular ethnic constituencies, leading to new ethnic armies when they
gained power. Other coup traps came to an end through pyrrhic victory: as in Sierra Leone,
when one ethnic faction finally managed to purge all others from the officer corps. Thus more
countries joined the ranks of those who had, with colonial collaboration, built ethnically loyal
7TNA WO 208/4386 71A & 80A.
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militaries from the beginning. Much of Africa was thus left with a legacy of ethnic armies
(see also Enloe 1975 & 1980; N’Diaye 2001).
This historic tendency to base military loyalty on ethnic foundations is critical to under-
standing contemporary struggles over African democratization.8 In Africa, most states are
highly diverse with no single ethnic group constituting a majority. The opening of political
competition and establishment of electoral processes—regardless of the extent or depth of
other democratic reforms—increases the likelihood that executive power will change hands
between leaders from different ethnic backgrounds. This otherwise normatively desirable
state of affairs poses a danger to political stability where past leaders had stacked the mil-
itary with their coethnics. Under a new leader, who no longer shares their identity, these
military officers will fear a decline in their power and privilege. The new leader may wish
to emulate his predecessor and create his own ethnic army, purging the existing one and
recruiting coethnics in their place. Or the new leader could be committed to non-ethnic,
inclusive state institutions and military diversification. Either set of policies requires dis-
mantling the inherited ethnic army. Such restructuring threatens existing officers, who now
face strong incentives to defend their positions of privilege. They may do so by blocking
democratization or by violently reversing the outcome of elections, deposing new leaders,
and restoring their coethnics to power. Figure 1 also summarizes the causal mechanisms by
which electoral transfers of power can lead to coup attempts.
8Democracy and democratization are heavily contested concepts, endowed with a wide range of meanings
and expectations across both societies and scholarly works. Yet, as Bratton and van de Walle contend,
in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, African countries took an “indispensable first step” on the path of
democratization by adopting competitive elections to install new leaders (1997, 10). It is in this sense that
I use the term democratization—as a critical juncture in African political development and the beginning of
a long and fragile process of liberalization and democratic consolidation.
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Hypothesis 2: Where elections or other constitutional transfers of executive power undermine
the “ethnic matching” between civil and military authorities, we should witness an increased
probability of a coup attempt.
[Figure 1 about here]
2.3.1 Cameroon: After Ahidjo
Returning to Cameroon, the aftermath of Ahmadou Ahidjo’s retirement illustrates
the danger to political stability posed by existing ethnic armies during electoral leadership
transitions, even ones of questionable democratic character.9 In 1982, facing severe ill health,
Ahidjo retired from office and was succeeded by Paul Biya, the current Prime Minister and
a Christian southerner from the ethnic Bulu group. In January of 1984, Biya secured his
presidency by winning his first full term in a general election. Immediately thereafter, he
sentenced Ahidjo to death in abstentia while simultaneously announcing his decision to
transfer Fulani/Peuhl soldiers from the Republican Guard, an elite paramilitary force still
dominated by Ahidjo’s coethnics, to other military units (Keesings 1984).
The very next day, threatened soldiers of the Republican Guard mounted a coup attempt
against Biya. The rebels took control of the radio station, attacked the presidential palace in
Yaounde` with artillery, seized the airport, and severed communication links. It took nearly
four days of intense fighting for loyal troops to put down the rebellion. Subsequently, the
Republican Guard was immediately disbanded, its loyal members placed under the command
of the Chief of the National Gendarmerie and its disloyal members purged (Ibid).
Using the failed coup attempt to his advantage, Biya then moved forward with discrim-
inatory hiring and promotion policies of his own, both within the civilian government and
9Indeed, this case is aptly comparable to later democratization efforts, when regimes were struggling to
adopt electoral mechanisms despite entrenched autocratic institutions.
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the military. Over the course of his reign, which continues today, southerners have come to
dominate both politics and the military (Minority Rights Group 2010). In particular, mem-
bers of Biya’s own southern Bulu group, as well as members of the closely related Beti group,
disproportionately hold key positions in the military (Minorities at Risk 2009). Stability was
thus re-achieved through renewed ethnic matching policies.
3 Data Collection and Coding Procedures
To evaluate whether the general historical experiences of African countries support
these hypotheses, I compiled existing data on Military coup attempts and coded original
cross-national data for the following, theoretically significant independent variables: Prior
ethnic violence, Loyalty choice, Ethnically matched officer corps, Ethnic change in leadership
transitions, and Prior ethnic stacking. The data was culled from a wide variety of sources
including archival documents,10 newspaper articles,11 reference books and tertiary qualitative
datasets,12 and secondary scholarly accounts.
Military coup attempts: To construct the dependent variables, I cross-referenced Mc-
Gowan’s dataset on African coups (2003) with the Archigos database on political leaders
(Goemans et al. 2009) and expanded that data to cover the years 1952-1955 and 2002-2012.
A minimum of two reports citing evidence of actual military violence, military occupation
10From the British National Archives (Kew), the French Colonial Archives (Aix-en-Provence), the French
Military Archives (Vincennes), the U.S. National Archives II (College Park), the National Archives of Senegal
(Dakar), and the Kenya National Archives (Nairobi).
11Principally from Keesings World News Archive, Lexus-Nexus Academic, Proquest Historical Newspapers,
and the BBC.
12Of particular importance were John Keegan’s World Armies, the Minorities at Risk Project, the World
Directory of Minorities and Indigenous People, the Library of Congress country studies, and the Encyclopedia
of 20th Century African History.
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of a government building, or military occupation of a communication or transportation center
count as a coup attempt.
Loyalty choice: If the initial leadership purposefully recruited officers and/or created
a presidential guard or personal militia from members of his own ethnic group—and, in
some cases, their known allies—then loyalty choice was coded as Ethnic. The creation of a
coethnic presidential guard, in particular, indicates that the leader is basing military loyalty
on ethnic foundations since this tactic later enables the ethnic restructuring or disarmament
of the regular army. On the other hand, if the first leader recruited officers from a diverse
cross-section of society, loyalty choice was coded as Inclusive.
Ethnically umatched (or matched) officer corps: This variable builds on codings of both
the ethnic heterogeneity of the officer corps and the ethnic identity of the independence era
leader. If an ethnic group dominated the officer corps, and the post-independence leader
shared that identity, then this variable is coded as Ethnically matched. If there was no pre-
existing officer corps, then no officers could rebel against its restructuring along ethnic lines.
Since this situation entails the same theoretical prediction (no rebellion), it is also coded as
matched. In all other cases the variable is coded as Ethnically unmatched.
Coding individual identity presents a number of challenges. Individuals can emphasize
aspects of their identity in strategic and flexible ways (Posner 2005). Leaders can also marry
outside of their own ethnic group and utilize the identity of their spouses to foster political
loyalty (Londregan et al. 1995, 6). Nonetheless, leaders usually self-identified—and were
identified by their contemporaries—as having a single ethnic identity. And while spousal
affiliations could play a role in the political game writ large, those who built coethnic armies
chose their own group and usually exclusively so (with some exceptions for traditional ethnic
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allies or neutrals). Where mixed identity did occur, then if any group dominated the officer
corps and that group matched part of the leader’s identity, the variable was coded as matched.
Defining when a particular ethnic group dominates the officer corps is difficult. Domi-
nance should imply such a majority that no other group has a realistic chance of successfully
seizing power. There is no clear numerical line, however, above which all cases would meet
the qualitative standard. Dominance, as defined above, depends on many factors, including
how many identity groups have representation in the military and how they are distributed
across the branches of military service. I have thus stayed with more qualitative under-
standings: did credible observers at the time think that the officer corps was dominated by
a particular group?
Bias in source materials then becomes an important concern. Perhaps observers had a
vested interest in portraying colonial military recruitment practices in a certain light—as
discriminating against their group or, conversely, in down-playing their group’s representa-
tion. Such tendencies could introduce significant distortion into the data. Careful attention
to sources and their potential biases can alleviate some of this concern. Most countries were
coded based on official military intelligence reports from the French and British archives.
When such documents were unavailable, I turned to the accounts of sociologists and histo-
rians writing about these militaries in close temporal proximity to decolonization.
Ethnic change (or continuity): For the democratization data, it is important to differen-
tiate between elections and electoral transfers of power. Autocratic regimes routinely hold
uncompetitive elections, known as electoral authoritarianism, that merely rubber stamp a
longtime leader’s hold on power. In order not to confuse autocratic elections with at least
partially democratic ones, I thus limit the universe of cases to elections that produced a
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turnover in executive power as well as other constitutional transfers of power (for example,
after the natural death of a leader).
The ethnicity of each leader, before and after the constitutional or electoral transfer of
power was then coded at the highest level of ethnic aggregation.13 If the ethnic identity of
the leader prior to the transition was different from that of the leader assuming power, the
power transfer was coded as an Ethnic change. Otherwise, it was coded as Ethnic continuity.
In no case was regional identity used as the basis of coding, even though region plays an
important role in the politics of many African countries—particularly in Sahelian states such
as Benin, Nigeria, and the Sudan where north-south divides are arguably more important
than ethnic differences in shaping the struggle for power. While such contextual awareness
in coding is desirable, it also increases the risk of fitting theory to the evidence rather than
evaluating hypotheses according to the data. For this reason, I follow the stricter coding
procedure.
Moreover, excluding regional considerations likely biases the results against the proposed
theory. In Africa, the ethnic homelands of powerful groups do not tend to cross important
administrative regional divides—which were largely constructed by colonial practices that
treated the groups separated by these boundaries differently. Thus, recoding by regional
identity would rarely alter a categorization of ethnic continuity into one of ethnic change.
Rather, we would only expect to find the reverse—codings of ethnic change that do not
involve a difference in region and thus, when coded by region, would become instances of
ethnic continuity. We do not expect to observe coup attempts in such cases where regional
identity is highly salient and power transfers between leaders from the same region. Thus,
coding by region would eliminate several “false negatives” as cases originally incorrectly
13Except in Somalia, where codings were based on clans.
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predicted to have coups would instead be successfully predicted as stable. Therefore, the
more stringent coding rule, which excludes regional identity, biases the results in a downward
direction—increasing our confidence in positive findings.
Prior ethnic stacking: This variable was coded 1 if the leader prior to the constitutional
transfer of power had stacked the military with his coethnics, and 0 otherwise. Similar
concerns over coding identity, defining dominance, and identifying source material bias arose
as with the Ethnically unmatched officer corps and Ethnic change variables and were handled
in the same manner.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I test the two primary implications of my theoretical framework using
different datasets—one covering the post-independence period and the other inclusive of
all electoral and other constitutional transfers of executive power. Following independence,
choosing ethnic loyalty despite a diverse officer corps should result in an ethnic coup trap
and thus greater instability. Later, during a constitutional transfer of power, if there is
an ethnic change in leadership—and the previous leader had stacked the military with his
coethnics—we also expect a coup attempt.
4.1 Descriptive Data
Table 2 presents the post-independence frequency of coup attempts broken down by
loyalty choice and the diversity of the officer corps created under colonial rule. For each cell,
I calculated the average number of coup attempts, across countries, in the 20 years following
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independence.14 The results are compelling: countries with unmatched officer corps’, whose
leaders chose to build ethnic armies, experienced on average four times as many coups as
other countries.
[Table 1 about here]
Turning to the context of democratization, from 1950 to 2007, there were 79 cases of
power changing hands from one African leader to another by constitutional means. The
majority of transitions (59) were the result of electoral processes, usually routine elections
within the context of an established democracy or as part of a planned democratization. The
20 non-electoral transitions stemmed from a variety of circumstances, mainly the natural
death (11) or retirement (4) of the previous leader.
Many of these power transfers were followed closely by violent military reactions: 33%
experienced a coup attempt within four years (41% of electoral transitions).15 Periodizing
the data by decade illustrates an important temporal pattern: as the third wave of democra-
tization swept across Africa in the 1990s, the number of constitutional leadership transitions
14This standardizes the time frame of analysis in a meaningful way. Changing the period of observation
to 15 years or to the total time since independence does not significantly change the results. Some minor
exceptions should be noted: first, for countries that lacked military institutions at independence, I calculated
the 20 year observation window from the establishment of their first military unit. Second, Liberia and
Ethiopia required special consideration. Ethiopia enters the dataset in 1941, the year that Italian occupation
forces were expelled during World War II and Haile Selassie restored to the throne. His resumption of power
marked a period of great military reform and professionalization—away from Ethiopia’s feudal military
obligation system and toward modern training academies. It was more difficult to determine a starting point
for Liberia because of its unique history. I chose 1960, when a great number of West African countries were
decolonized and the threat of colonialism was thoroughly removed.
15Although one might expect military officers to react immediately to perceived threats to their corpo-
rate interests, in some contexts it makes more sense for military officers to wait. Coups are highly risky
endeavors—the punishment for treason often involves death. And, in the absence of actual restructuring,
the relative power of ethnic military factions does not decline. Officers motivated by self-preservation may
thus exhaust all other alternatives before attempting a coup. Four years, the length of a typical election
cycle, was thus chosen as a reasonable observation window.
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skyrocketed, from 8 (3 electoral) in the 1980s to 29 (27 electoral) in the 1990s. Yet, so too
did the number of coup attempts undermining those transitions, from 2 or 25% (2 or 67%
of electoral) in the 1980s to 11 or 38% (10 or 37% of electoral) in the 1990s. And while the
record has improved in the 2000s, the problem has by no means disappeared. The online
appendix contains a full breakdown of the reasons for each constitutional transfer of power
as well as their periodization over time with resulting coup attempts.
Approximately 57% of these constitutional power transfers involved a change in the
ethnicity of leadership. Table 5 depicts the relationship between ethnic changes in leadership,
the tendency of previous leaders to build coethnic armies, and coup attempts. Where leaders
had successfully constructed coethnic armies and constitutional processes then brought to
power new leaders from different ethnic backgrounds, those ethnic armies reacted by seizing
power—75% of the time.
[Table 2 about here]
4.2 Regression Analysis
These cross-national patterns lend preliminary support to the theories developed in this
article. They do not, however, control for potentially confounding variables, test alternative
explanations, or rigorously estimate uncertainty. I thus turn to regression analysis.16 Two
distinct models are leveraged to further test the hypotheses.
First, I have argued that countries choosing to build ethnic armies despite diverse officer
corps’ should experience greater relative instability following independence. To test this
implication of the theory, I use the total count of military coup attempts in the 20 years
16All statistical models were run in R using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 2007).
26
following independence. Since the variance-to-mean ratio of this dependent variable (2.7)
suggests over-dispersion, a negative binomial model is employed.17
Finally, I have argued that countries whose leaders have employed ethnic stacking policies
in the past are vulnerable to military reactivity when processes of democratization bring new
leaders to power from different ethnic groups. I analyze this hypothesis using logit regression
on the same coup variable constructed for the descriptive democratization data: whether a
coup attempt occurred in the 4 years following a constitutional transfer of executive power.
This analysis is run on two versions of the data: (1) all constitutional changes in leadership
and (2) only electoral successions of power.
Given the small size of each data set and its low power, only a limited number of variables
and interaction effects could be included. I thus use category dummies to test the theory
(based on Tables 1 and 2). For the decolonization model, I constructed indicators for a choice
of ethnic loyalty given an unmatched officer corps (Ethnic & unmatched), ethnic loyalty
with a matched officer corps (Ethnic & matched), and inclusive loyalty with an unmatched
officer corps (Inclusive & unmatched). For the democratization models, I constructed similar
indicator variables for the following categories: an ethnic change in leadership given an
existing ethnic army (Ethnic change & stacking), an ethnic change in the absence of a prior
ethnic army (Ethnic change & no stacking), and ethnic continuity in leadership given an
ethnic army (Ethnic continuity & stacking). This leaves those countries with a matched
colonial officer corps who chose to construct an inclusive military (decolonization data) and
those countries who experienced experienced ethnic continuity given an inclusive officer corps
(democratization data) as the residual categories.
1713 of 43 countries experienced no coup attempts in this time period, for a 0 rate of 30.2%. Given that
the negative binomial model can account for this type of over-dispersion, a zero-inflated model was not
employed.
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The control variables were also carefully selected on the basis of theoretical significance.
Complete descriptions and summary statistics are contained in the online appendix. Based
on extant studies, controls were included for relative wealth (Ln GDP/k),18 Prior coups,
and ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Ethnic diversity (Roeder, 2001)). The Ethnic violence
variable was also included in the decolonization models to control for any effects that such
past violence may have continued to exert on political stability, even though loyalty choices
were not determined by it.
It is also reasonable to think that economic shocks, understood as sharp downturns in a
country’s economic well-being, may increase coup risk. As public support for the incumbent
government declines, recessions can create opportunities for many types of violence, including
coups (Alesina et al. 1996; Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000). Systematic preindependence
economic data was unavailable and thus could not be included in the count model where
it would be appropriate. For the democratization models, an Economic shock variable was
coded 1 if, in any year during the four year period following the leadership transition, the
country experienced a negative growth rate of 1% or more, and 0 otherwise.19 3%, 5%,
and 10% economic shock variables were also coded in a parallel fashion to capture increasing
levels of crisis severity. An alternative measure using the country’s lowest (i.e., worst) current
account balance (CAB) as a percentage of GDP was also constructed. Large current account
balance deficits tend to cause (or at least reflect) greater financial struggles as well as a
government’s inability to pay its employees—including the military.
Clark (2007) and Lindberg and Clark (2008) have argued that the legitimacy accrued
through processes of political liberalization may serve to inoculate regimes against military
18Measured in the year of independence or the year of a power transfer.
19If during the four year period of observation there was a coup attempt or another constitutional change
in leadership, the period was truncated so as not to introduce reverse causality.
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overthrow. This insight is drawn from liberal democratic theory, which posits that demo-
cratic regimes enjoy legitimacy in both the eyes of the general population and amongst im-
portant elites such as military actors. Thus, as a state travels from authoritarianism through
the various stages of democratic transition and liberalization towards consolidated democ-
racy, its legitimacy should correspondingly grow, decreasing its susceptibility to military
overthrow (Lindberg and Clark 2008, 89). Trajectories of increasing liberalization should
thus correlate to reduced coup risk while trajectories towards authoritarian regression may
have the opposite effect.
Measuring legitimacy, however, is inherently difficult as legitimacy is at once a sub-
jective and contextually dependent phenomenon (Clark 2007, 143). Survey data, such as
that provided by Afrobarometer, may ultimately provide the best measure but is currently
unavailable across enough countries and years to systematically measure trajectories of legit-
imacy. Alternatively, I employ the following imperfect proxy in the democratization models:
if theories of democratic legitimacy are correct, then general trajectories of state legitimacy
should track changes in the rights and freedoms afforded to society. I thus include a measure,
Change in Civil Liberties, that is coded as the difference in a state’s Freedom House civil
liberties score between the year in which a constitutional power transfer occurred and the
end of the observation window. Such data is, unfortunately, unavailable for the immediate
postcolonial years.
Many scholars have also articulated a potential relationship between natural resources
and conflict, including coups. Natural resource rents could stabilize governments by pro-
viding fiscal revenue, independent of citizens, that can be used to increase the repressive
capabilities of the state (Ross 2004)—including coup proofing. Other scholars propose an al-
ternative mechanism: that revenues from the sale of natural resources increase the potential
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rewards of state control, thereby encouraging attempts to seize power (Collier and Hoeﬄer
2005, 4-5; Humphreys 2005, 519). We thus have two mechanisms, pulling in opposite direc-
tions. For the count model, I include a dummy variable, Mineral exporter, for whether oil,
gas, or other minerals constituted a principal export at independence (Mitchell 2003; United
Nations 1965). For the logit models on democratization, I include Humphreys’ variable for
Oil production—the average daily per capita barrel production for the year of the transition.
For the logit models on electoral transitions only, three additional control variables are
considered. First, closely contested elections may increase the probability of a violent military
response by those officers sympathetic to the losing side. Drawn from Lindberg’s data on
African elections, Margin of victory is measured by subtracting the vote share of the second
place candidate or party from that of the winner (2009). Second, continuity in leadership
may exist despite a change in the chief executive. If the new leader held a significant post
in the old regime, or if the same political party maintains power, then military officers may
not fear restructuring despite the transition. Following Lindberg again, Regime continuity
is coded 1 if the pre- and post-transition leaders belong to the same political party or if
the post-transition leader held an integral post in the prior administration, such as the vice-
president, foreign minister, or secretary of state. Finally, past success with peaceful, electoral
transfers of power could encourage the military to refrain from intervention. Prior successful
transfer, is coded 1 if at any point in the past—no matter how long ago—executive power
was transferred constitutionally/electorally without a subsequent successful coup attempt,
and 0 otherwise.
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4.2.1 Results
The regression analysis confirms the findings of the descriptive statistics. Countries
whose leaders chose to build ethnic armies despite facing an existing, diverse officer corps
tended to face substantially more coups than their counterparts. In the count model, the Eth-
nic & Unmatched category is positive and statistically significant (see Table 3). Considering
that coups are relatively rare events, the substantive effect is quite important. Attempting
to construct an ethnic army despite existing diversity in the officer corps is predicted to
result in four times as many coups (see Figure 2).
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
Likewise, the multivariate results for the democratization data confirm the descriptive
findings. Table 4 presents the regression results for both the full set of constitutional power
transfers as well as the elections only data. While both the Ethnic continuity & stacking
and Ethnic change & stacking categories are significantly associated with increased coup risk
across models, the magnitude of the effect is comparatively small: 12-25% risk compared to
the 0% risk of the baseline category (ethnic continuity and prior inclusive army). The Ethnic
change & stacking category, on the other hand, has a drastically higher predicted coup risk:
66% for all constitutional power transitions and 89% when elections are involved, all else
being equal (see Figure 3).
Few of the control variables attained statistical significance. Prior success with democ-
racy, no matter how long ago, seems to decrease coup risk. While statistically significant,
however, the effect is somewhat marginal: decreasing coup risk by under one percentage
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point. Economic shocks also increase the risk of a coup when closely following an elec-
tion. Here, the substantive effect is strong: A 1% contraction of the economy leads to a
14.1 percentage point increase in coup risk while a 3% contraction increases that risk by
an additional 34.6 percentage points. Similarly, in the all constitutional transfers data, a
3% economic shock was statistically significant (even though the 1% contraction was not),
resulting in an increase of 40.8 percentage points in coup risk. No other variables were
consistently statistically significant, including prior Ethnic violence, Ln GDPk, Prior coups,
Ethnic Diversity, and Change in civil liberties.
[Table 4 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
4.2.2 Robustness Checks
Due to substantial variation in the types of constitutional changes in leadership, unit
heterogeneity may undermine the comparability of these observations. A separate analysis
was thus conducted on the most homogeneous subset of electoral transitions—those regularly
scheduled or occurring through planned democratization efforts (n=35). Both the Ethnic
change & stacking category and the Economic shock variable retained their statistical sig-
nificance and direction and showed a slight increase in magnitude (for full results, see the
online appendix).
Further robustness checks were conducted by substituting alternative measures for sev-
eral of the control variables as well as by introducing further controls for other potentially
important factors. The online appendix contains descriptions of each of these additional
variables as well as the full statistical results. Across all models, the competing ethnic
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fractionalization measures of Alesina et al. (2003), Fearon (2003(a)), and Posner (2004)
were substituted for ELF. Two measures for ethnic dominance were also constructed from
Fearon’s data: percent share of the largest group in the total population and whether any
group constituted more than 50% of the population. Indicator variables were included for
ongoing civil wars, which could place independent strains on civil-military relations, as well
as for Herbst’s measurement of difficult geography.
For the democratization models, oil reserves and diamond production data were substi-
tuted for oil production. Alternative measures for prior coups were also constructed: the
count of successful coups in the ten years prior to the power transfer and the number of years
since the last attempt. Polity IV scores, raw Freedom House civil liberty scores, and regime
type (following Lindberg and Clark 2008) were also added as substitute measures for legit-
imacy. Additionally, Powell (2012) finds that characteristics of military organizations have
an important influence on general coup risk and Powell and Lasley (2012) argue that the
anti-coup censure and sanctions imposed by the African Union have had a deterrent effect on
coup attempts. Thus, their measures for military expenditures per soldier, counterbalancing
paramilitary forces, the log of military personnel, and African Union membership are also
included.
None of these robustness checks meaningfully change the results for the key independent
variables. During the decolonization period, choosing ethnic loyalty despite an unmatched
officer corps remains statistically significant, in the same direction, and of the same magni-
tude. None of the additional control variables were significant in the decolonization models.
Likewise, with the democratization data, the category variable indicating an ethnic change
in leadership combined with prior ethnic stacking remained statistically significant, positive,
and of the same general magnitude across robustness checks. The majority of the control
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variables were insignificant including the military organization variables, raw civil liberty
score, Polity measures, AU membership, ongoing civil war, and Herbst’s difficult geography.
Alternative measures for prior coups, however, were statistically significant. Indeed, leaders
seemed particularly vulnerable to military overthrow when a recent coup had led to the
election that brought them to power.
5 Conclusion
I have argued throughout this article that understanding Africa’s susceptibility to
military coups requires a contextually sensitive and nuanced appreciation for ethnic politics
and the manipulation of ethnicity within state security institutions. Where early African
leaders attempted to build coethnic armies, despite existing ethnic diversity in their officer
corps’, they often launched their countries into severe coup traps. Many of these traps
could only end in pyhhric victory, as one group established homogeneity through violent
purges of the ranks. Such countries then joined those who, with the help of departing
colonizers, had successfully built ethnic armies from the beginning. This historical legacy of
stacking military institutions with coethnics has had grave consequences for contemporary
democratization efforts. When elections bring to power new leaders from different ethnic
groups, these entrenched ethnic armies react by attempting to seize power.
Given the highly multi-ethnic character of most African societies, we should embrace
the normative ideal of constitutional politics that allow for the rotation of power between
individuals and groups of different identities. The alternative is an ethnic state that indefi-
nitely excludes much of its population from power. Such ethnic states fail to meet important
standards of justice and equity. Recent research also suggests that exclusionary states are
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especially prone to insurgency and the devastation of civil war (see Cederman, Wimmer, and
Min 2010; Roessler 2011; and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Multi-ethnic democracy,
and indeed long-term peace and stability, thus require dismantling ethnic armies.
And yet, this article underscores the difficulty and danger involved in restructuring mil-
itary institutions—in dissembling ethnic patronage networks and building merit-based re-
cruitment and promotion systems in their place. Ethnic armies will not sit idly by and allow
for their own demise. The international community can play a limited role in helping willing
governments to reform security institutions, particularly where peacekeepers or other moni-
tors have already been deployed. External military personnel can serve as neutral arbiters,
offer training and educational assistance in the mechanics of running a merit-based army,
and detect coup plots where they are physically present. Yet, outsiders may have little sway
over the long-term entrenchment of merit-based security institutions. Once foreign missions
depart, they can no longer ensure that civilian leaders will not revert to ethnic recruitment
practices. Nor can they prevent disenchanted or fearful officers from taking violent action.
Lasting military reform is an ordeal that must be grappled with domestically.
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Table 1 – Average Number of Coups within 20 years of Independence
Loyalty Choice
inclusive ethnic
ethnically 0.50 0.91
matched (n=6) (n=11)
Officer Corps
ethnically 1.07 3.91
unmatched (n=14) (n=12)
Bivariate negative binomial (coup count ∼ unmatched x ethnic cell)= 1.4319 (p ≤ 0.001)
OLS= 2.9812 (p ≤ 0.001)
Missing Cases: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of the Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritius, Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe, and the Sudan.
Table 2 – Coups after Constitutional Transfers of Power (% of Cases)
Prior Ethnic Stacking
no yes
ethnic continuity 0% 16.7%
(n=15) (n=12)
Power Transfer
ethnic change 22.7% 75.0%
(n=22) (n=20)
Bivariate logic (coup ∼ ethnic change x prior ethnic army)= 2.8904 (p> 0.0001)
Missing Observations: Cape Verde (91, 01), Comoros (96, 98, 06), Liberia (97), Mozambique (86), Sa˜o Tome´
and Pr´ıncipe (91, 01), and the Sudan (86).
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Table 3 – Count (Negative Binomial) Model
DV= number of coup attempts in first 20 years after independence
standard errors, n=43
coeff (se)
Ethnic & unmatched 1.8709** (0.6394)
Ethnic & matched 0.4166 (0.7062)
Inclusive & unmatched 0.7040 (0.5583)
Prior ethnic violence 0.2214 (0.2984)
Ln GDP/k -0.1718 (0.2622)
Mineral exporter -0.1678 (0.3404)
Ethnic diversity 0.4618 (0.5408)
Intercept 0.3916 (1.8862)
∗ ∗ ∗ = p ≤ 0.001, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01, ∗ = p ≤ 0.05
Figure 2 – Decolonization and Predicted Coup Count
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Table 4 – Determinants of Military Coups after Constitutional Transfers of Power
Logit, DV= Coup Attempt within 4 Years
robust errors, n=69 for all transfers and 51 for elections only
all transfers elections only
a b c d
Ethnic change & stacking 20.68*** 32.48*** 36.56*** 30.78*** 39.75***
(1.564) (7.446) (7.916) (6.703) (10.17)
Ethnic change & no stacking 17.80*** 27.63*** 31.16*** 25.46*** 33.10***
(1.483) (6.182) (5.967) (5.306) (7.578)
Ethnic continuity & stacking 18.51*** 27.59*** 30.64*** 26.90*** 31.74***
(1.370) (6.504) (6.820) (5.586) (7.376)
Prior coups 0.413 0.263 -0.038 0.080 0.493
(0.397) (0.543) (0.794) (0.474) (0.681)
Ln GDPk -1.257 -1.242 -1.617 -1.727 -2.961
(0.939) (1.372) (1.374) (1.700) (2.880)
Ethnic diversity -0.871 -12.21 -15.43** -9.682 -20.26
(2.929) (6.812) (5.946) (6.544) (10.40)
Economic shock 1.169 7.018* 9.209* 5.460 7.567
(0.762) (3.435) (3.739) (2.909) (3.892)
Oil production 21.64 36.47 39.63 26.74 63.94
(25.40) (34.65) (34.21) (39.09) (75.62)
∆ civil liberties 0.226 1.966 3.045* 1.064 1.293
(0.712) (1.425) (1.418) (1.164) (1.720)
Margin of victory 0.026
(0.039)
Regime continuity -1.456
(1.673)
Prior successful -5.920*
electoral transfer (2.713)
Intercept -11.17 -15.30 -15.19 -10.80 -4.029
(6.787) (8.192) (8.575) (10.05) (16.75)
∗ ∗ ∗ = p ≤ 0.001, ∗∗ = p ≤ 0.01, ∗ = p ≤ 0.05
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Figure 3 – Ethnicity, Power Transfers, and Predicted Coup Probabilities
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